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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000196-CA
Priority No. 15

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for
Attempted Aggravated Assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101 and 76-5-103(3) (1999), in the
Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable
Michael K. Burton, Judge, presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred

on this court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
See Addendum A (Judgment, Sentence and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
ISSUE: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in adjusting
a restitution upward to $19,646.15 where Appellant was originally
ordered to pay $16,000 at his sentencing?
Standard of Review: "We will not disturb a trial court's
order of restitution unless the 'trial court exceeds the
authority prescribed by law or abuses its discretion.'" State v.
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992) (quotation and
citations omitted).

PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Benjamin Matthew Nunley 1 s ("Nunley") challenge to
the restitution order is preserved on the record for appeal
("R.") at 64 (restitution hearing).

His underlying sentencing is

preserved at R.65.
STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) is determinative of the
issue on appeal.

It provides in relevant part:

Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—Civil
penalties- -Restitution—Hearing—Definitions
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a: . . . (ii) plea of
guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which
the defendant is convicted or any other criminal
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility
to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but
not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of
the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent
of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise
harmed, and losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing,
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a
governmental entity for extradition or transportation
and as further defined in Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result
of the defendant's criminal activities. . . .
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of
the following sentences or combination of them: . . . (c) to
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probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; . .
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any
other sentence it may impose, the court shall order that the
defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided
in this subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning as
defined in Subsection (1)(e).
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate,
the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as
provided in Subsections (4)(c) and ( 4 ) ( d ) . . . .
(b) . . . (ii) In determining whether restitution is
appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine
complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused
by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution
the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the
defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at
the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8).
(d) (i) If the court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the
court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of the
court record. . . .
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or
distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the time
of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on the
issue. . . .
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct
in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for
complete restitution, the court shall consider all relevant
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facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related
professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatric, and psychological care, including
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the
income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if
the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; . .
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for
court-ordered restitution, the court shall consider the
factors listed in Subsection (8)(b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with
regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on
an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed
by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court
determines make restitution inappropriate.
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer
entering an order of restitution if the court
determines that the complication and prolongation of
the sentencing process, as a result of considering an
order of restitution under this subsection,
substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution
to the victim.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Nunley was charged by information with one count of
aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(3) (1999).
issued.

R.3.

R.l-2.

An arrest warrant was

Nunley entered a plea of guilty to attempted

aggravated assault, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah

4

Code Ann. §§ 76-5-103(3) and 76-4-101.

R.20.

A sentencing hearing was held on January 11, 2000.

R.65.

Nunley was ordered to pay $16,000 (including $521 in medical
expenses) in restitution at $1000 per month, in addition to
court-ordered counseling.

R.41-42(minute Entry),43(Judgment and

Sentence),65 [16-20] . At Nunley's request, a restitution hearing
was held on February 22, 2000.

R.44,64.

The victim, Joe Pilcher

("Pilcher"), testified that his actual lost wages and medical
bills totaled $19,646.

R.64 [9-10,13-16] . The hearing judge

imposed $19,646 in restitution to be payed at a rate of $1000 per
month.

R.64[21] . Nunley timely appeals.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Nunley entered a plea of guilty to attempted aggravated
assault.

R.20 (Plea Agreement).

The Information alleged that

Nunley struck Pilcher in the knee with a baseball bat during a
driving dispute.

R.l-2.

At a sentencing hearing held January 11, 2000, Nunley was
sentenced to one year in jail.

R. 41-42.

The jail term was

suspended pending satisfactory completion of probation.

Id.

The

Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR"), which was considered by
the court at sentencing, noted that Pilcher!s damages, including
medical bills, amounted to $15,500.

R.27.

At the hearing, the

State averred, and Nunley conceded that Pilcher!s actual damages
were about $16,000.

R.65[5].

Accordingly, the court ordered

Nunley to pay $16,000 to Pilcher as compensation for lost
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earnings during the six-week period he could not work and the
$521 in medical bills that he had to pay as a result of his
injuries.

R.41-42 (Minute Entry).

At Nunleyfs request, a restitution hearing was held on
February 22, 2000.

R.44,64.

Nunley sought to challenge the

$16,000 figure ordered by the court.

Id.

Pilcher testified as

to his injury, his medical bills totaling $521.15, his work as a
plumber, the period he could not work, and his typical billings
for various periods of the year.

R.64[4-16].

He established

March through May, the period in which he was laid up with his
injury, were his most profitable months.

R.64[9].

The court found that Pilcher averaged $19,125 in lost wages
during those months.

R.64[21].

When added to the $521 in

medical bills, the court concluded that Nunley owed Pilcher
$19,646.15 total.

Id.

The court accordingly amended the

restitution amount to $19,646.15.

Id.

Nunley objected to the upwardly amended restitution amount
at the hearing.

R.64[21-26].

He asserted that he knew two other

plumbers who would be willing to testify that Pilcherfs billing
rates were inflated, and suggested that Pilcher's billing records
could be falsified.

R.64[22].

Nunley further suggested that

Pilcher produce previous income tax returns to prove his income.
R.64[25].
As to Nunley!s proposed witnesses, the court asked Nunley
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why he did not present those witnesses at the hearing.

R.64[24].

Nunley responded that he did not know that people would be able
to testify at this particular proceeding, and claimed that he did
not know about "court procedure."

Id.

The court invited Nunley

to present the witnesses at another hearing, but told Nunley that
he would not change the restitution order based simply on
Nunley f s own summary of what the proposed witnesses might say.
R.64 [25-26].

The court also informed Nunley that he would have

to provide notice to the court if he planned on calling the
witnesses, as well as inform the witnesses that they needed to
come to testify.

R.64[26].

As to the tax returns, the court noted that they would not
be helpful in that Pilcher made more money in the spring months,
when he was laid up with his injury, than at other times of the
year.

R.64[26].

Nunley responded that they would nonetheless

provide proof of an average income.

R.64[26].

The court concluded that it was "comfortable with the
substantialness [sic] of the proof."

R.64[26].

The judge

further stated that Nunley
hit [Pilcher] with a baseball bat in the knee and
ma[d]e it so he couldn't work [from March to May, and
so] he lost that kind of income. . . . I think he has
billables there that show a time when he did less work,
that that's what he got.
That's why I'm comfortable with the substance of
what he's given me; but if you have somebody who's got
a contradictory view, I guess I'm happy to hear that,
but I guess we need to have notice. . . . And I guess
you need to know that they need to be told to come.
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R.64 [26] .
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court abused its discretion in amending the
restitution amount upward from $16,000 to $19,646.15.

The

maximum amount of restitution that the court could impose was
factually established at Nunley's sentencing, where it arrived at
the $16,000 amount based on the PSR and a figure presented by the
State and agreed to by Nunley.

Moreover, the $16,000 figure

adequately reflected statutory considerations prescribed in Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (1999) . The increase of the restitution
award chills Nunley's right to a restitution hearing.
Accordingly, the trial could only impose a maximum of $16,000,
and less if the evidence merited it, at Nunley's restitution
hearing.
ARGUMENT
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ORDERING RESTITUTION IN AN AMOUNT THAT EXCEEDED THE
FACTUALLY ESTABLISHED FIGURE OF $16,000.
The trial court abused its discretion in ordering Nunley to
pay $19,646.15 in restitution under § 76-3-201.
Twitchell, 832 P.2d 866, 868 (Utah App. 1992).

See State v.
A "trial court

[has] both discretion in sentencing to select one or a
combination of options including probation, see [] § 76-3-201(1),
and a mandate to order restitution when appropriate: 'When a
person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has resulted
in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may
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impose, the court shall order that the defendant make
restitution' to victims unless it determines that restitution is
inappropriate, id. at § 76-3-201(3)(a) []; see also State v.
Snyder, 747 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1987)." State v. Dickey. 841 P.2d
1203, 1207 (Utah App. 1992).
The trial court's "authority [to order restitution,]
however, is limited by the sentencing statute.
Ann. § 76-3-201(2) (Supp.199[9]).

See Utah Code

Therefore, we will not disturb

the court's restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed
by law or otherwise abused its discretion."

State v. Schweitzer,

943 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1997) (citing Twitchell, 832 P.2d at
868; State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887-88 (Utah 1978)).
The guidelines for determining the amount of restitution to
be imposed are outlined in § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) and -(8) (a)-(c) .
They are as follows:
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal
activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages1, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to
victims of crime as provided in this subsection, or for
conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make
restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes
of restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Subsection (1) (e) . . . .
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution
for an offense, the offense shall include any criminal
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing

1

Section 76-3-201 (1) (c) provides, "'Pecuniary damages1
means all special damages . . . which a person could recover
against a defendant in a civil action arising out of the facts or
events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and
includes . . . losses including earnings and medical expenses."
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court or to which the defendant agrees to pay
restitution. A victim of an offense, that involves as
an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed
by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of
the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall
consider all relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related
professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatric, and psychological care, including
nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the
income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if
the offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; . .
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court
shall consider the factors listed in Subsection (8) (b)
and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the
burden that payment of restitution will impose, with
regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on
an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed
by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the
payment of restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines
make restitution inappropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (8) (a)-(c) .
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion
in ordering Nunley to pay $19,646.15 because the trial court had
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previously established the amount of restitution at $16,000 when
it considered the PSR and the State's adjusted figures to arrive
at that dollar amount.

R.27;65[5].

Accordingly, the $16,000

figure became fact as to the amount of loss for restitution
purposes under § 76-3-201.

See State v. Tindal, 748 P.2d 695

(Wash. App. 1988) . The court, therefore, could impose a maximum
of $16,000, or less if the evidence merited it, at Nunley's
succeeding restitution hearing.
In Tindal, the Court of Appeals for the State of Washington
held that the amount of restitution that the defendant owed was
legally established for purposes of restitution where the
"certificate of probable cause set forth the amount" and the
certificate was "incorporated by reference into the plea
agreement" underlying the restitution order.

Id. at 696.

The

Court stated that the specified amount "bee[a]me[] fact" and,
therefore, that defendant could be ordered to pay it under
Washington's restitution statute.

Id. (citing RCW 9.94A.370 (2)) .

Accordingly, the Washington Court of Appeals vacated the
restitution order of $25,666.39 because it exceeded the factually
established amount.

Id.

The reasoning of Tindal compels the conclusion that the
trial court in the present case abused its discretion in ordering
Nunley to pay $19,646.15.

At the January 11, 2000, sentencing

hearing, the court established that Nunley owed Pilcher $16,000.
R.41-41 (minute entry).

That figure was premised upon a figure

of $15,500 set forth in the PSR, R.27, which was "incorporated"
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into the sentencing hearing.

Tindal, 748 P.2d at 696; R.65[5].

The $16,000 amount was also premised on an adjusted estimate of
$16,000 proposed by the State and agreed to by Nunley at his
sentencing hearing.

R.65[5].

Moreover, the figures set forth by the PSR and the State
adequately reflect the statutorily prescribed considerations
contained in § 76-3-201(4) (a) (i) (lost earnings and medical
expenses) and § 76-3-201(8) (a) (ii) (medical expenses and lost
income resulting from physical injury suffered by victim).

The

PSR statement regarding Pilcher's damages evinces the way in
which it adequately accounted for the factors set forth in § 763-201:
The victim [] estimat[ed] his medical expenses at $500
but will provide the court with an exact amount. He []
estimated losing profits of $15,000 due [to] his not
being able to work . . . for one and one-half months.
He stated his average daily gross income at that
particular time of year is $500 per day, and was unable
to perform his usual duties for 30 working days.
R.27.

The transcript concerning the State's minor adjustment to

$16,000, which Nunley agreed to, likewise reflects Pilcher's
damages.

R.65[5].

Finally, as a matter of policy, trial courts under similar
circumstances as those of the case at bar should not be able to
increase the amount of a restitution order because it chills a
defendant's exercise of his right to a restitution hearing.

See

State v. Starnes, 841 P.2d 712, 715 (Utah App. 1992) ("defendant
is statutorily entitled to a 'full hearing' on the question of
restitution") (citing § 76-3-201 (3) (c)) . As in cases where
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defendants prevail on appeal and cannot thereafter be sentenced
more harshly, defendants like Nunley, who agree with the State as
to the amount of restitution at a preceding sentencing hearing,
should not be subject to an increased restitution order simply
because they elect to have the restitution hearing to which they
are entitled.

See, e.g., State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 180

(Utah 1981) . Indeed, the specter of either the prosecution or
the court threatening the possibility of a higher restitution
award should the defendant proceed with a restitution hearing
acts as the same sort of hindrance to the exercise of such right
as the threat of a harsher sentence after a successful appeal.
Id.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its
discretion in increasing Nunleyfs restitution award.
Twitchell, 832 P.2d at 868.

See

For purposes of restitution, the

$16,000 figure "bee[a]me[] fact" because the State, the court,
and Nunley agreed to that amount at the sentencing hearing.
Tindal, 748 P.2d at 696.

Moreover, the $16,000 figure adequately

represents the statutory guidelines set forth in § 76-3-201.
Finally, the trial court's increased restitution order chills
Nunley1s exercise of his statutory right to a restitution
hearing.

See Starnes, 841 P.2d at 715; see, e.g., Sorensen, 639

P.2d at 180. Accordingly, the trial court could only impose a
maximum of $16,000, or a lesser amount if the evidence warranted
it, at Nunley!s succeeding restitution hearing.
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CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Nunley respectfully requests this
Court to vacate the erroneous restitution order and remand for
resentencing.
SUBMITTED this

/£&

day of June, 2000.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
(J
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

ROBERT K. HEINEMAN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, CATHERINE E. LILLY, hereby certify that I have caused to
be hand-delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court
of Appeals, 450 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114023 0, and four copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office,
Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Third Floor, P.O.
Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this

JOt

June, 2000.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
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day of

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT MURRAY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 991200735 FS

BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

MICHAEL K. BURTON
January 11, 2000

Clerk:
lindav
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: October 11, 1971
Audio
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
(amended) Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/17/1999 Guilty Plea
SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365
day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s).
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE
$1000.00 PER MONTH BEGINNING 2/28/2000
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0

Page l

Case No: 991200735

Date:

Jan 11, 2000

PROBATION CONDITIONS
Pay fines and fees as agreed
No Violations of the Law
Evaluation and Treatment as deemed necessary.
COURT ORDERED DEFT TO COMPLETE ANGER MANAGEMENT CLASSES AND FAMILY
COUNSELING AS AP&P DIRECTS
DEFT TO PAY RESTITUTION OF $16,000.00
COURT ORDERED $1000.00 DUE 2/28/2000.
DEFT TO REPORT TO AP&P (PRESTON KAY) IMMEDIATELY
COURT ORDERS JAIL TO BE IMPOSED IF RESTITUTION IS NOT PAID, AS
ORDERED.
Dated this j f

day of

CL^

, 20 oo

Page 2 (last)

.

THIRD DI9TRICT COURT MURRAY COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

$ MINUTES
: RESTITUTION HEARING

vs.

Case No: 991200735 FS

BENJAMIN MATTHEW NUNLEY,
Defendant.

Judges
Date:

MICHAEL K. BURTON
February 22, 2000

PRESENT
Clerk:
lindav
Prosecutor: WALSH, DAVID
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HEINEMAN, ROBERT K
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth? October 11, 1971
Audio
Tape Number:
00-128
Tape Count: 650
CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
(amended) Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/17/1999 Guilty Plea
HEARING
COUNT: 650
JOE PILCHER, VICTIM, SWORN AND TESTIFIES ON STATE BEHALF. STATE
EXHIBIT 1 (INVOICES) WERE MARKED, OFFERED AND IDENTIFIED BY VICTIM.
COUNT: 1300
STATE REDIRECT OF JOE PILCHER
COUNT: 1110
DEFT CROSS EXAMINATION OF VICTIM. STATE WITHDRAWS EXHIBIT.
COUNT: 1700
COURT ORDERS RESTITUTION DUE IN AMOUNT OF $19125.00 FOR WAGES AND
PROFIT LOST, $521.00 MEDICAL FOR TOTAL: $19646.15
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Case No: 991200735
Date:
Feb 22, 2000
COUNT: 1960
DEPT'S STATEMENT TO COURT AND OBJECTION TO AMOUNT DUE. COURT
ADVISES DBPT TO HAVE HIS ATTORNEY MOTION THIS UP AGAIN, IP
NECESSARY.
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